The way we have always conducted voting during general elections has NOT been, strictly speaking, by SECRET ballot. Secrecy of a ballot does not only mean that the voter enters the booth "alone". It also means that the person into whose custody the ballot papers end up being deposited, whether for counting or safe-keeping, CANNOT match the ballot papers to the corresponding vote casters. Anything short of this compromises the secrecy of the ballot. Sadly, it has always been possible to construct a full correspondence between the vote casters and the cast ballots. This is how:
Voters stand in single file, and as each voter enters the voting precicnt, a tent, his/her name is read out aloud from the voters' roll. Thus anybody listening can draw up an ordered list of voters as they enter the voting boot. Indeed the party representatives present need just enter a number in ascending sequence, opposite the name of the voter on their copies of the IEC-supplied voters' roll. The above done, all interested "observers" have an ordered list of voters at the relevant polling station. Now all they need is to obtain an oredered list of ballot papers cast at the same station and voila, the match between ballot caster and ballot paper is done. "Cast in stone" one could say!
The ordered list of ballot papers is provided by the people conducting the vote, i.e. the Independent E lectoral Commission (IEC). A stack of ballot papers is piled on the table. Each paper has a serial number written on it, and the numbers are sequential. If the number on the top paper is C070563243, then the paper below it carries the number C070563244, the paper below that one is numbered C070563245 and so on. Now, here is the catch: you the voter, are not allowed to take any ballot paper other than the one right at the top of the stack! You cannot choose a ballot paper low down on the pile so as to achieve a level of anonymity. And what's worse, the police are sitting right next to the ballot papers, complete with their handcuffs. I have been threatenned with arrest when I insisted on pulling a ballot paper low down on the stack. Needless to say, I complied.
The serial numbers of the ballot papers supplied to any polling station are publicly announced, at least to the representatives of political parties. No attempt is made by IEC personnel to cover the serial number on the topmost ballot paper either. Consequently, armed with the self-composed oredered list of voters and the IEC-announced range of ORDERED ballot serial numbers, any "observer" then easily matches a voter's identity to the corresponding ballot paper cast by that voter. Secrecy my foot!
But a good level of ballot secrecy can be achieved even without sophisticated tools. Twenty people can be allowed into a tent/pre-booth, not withstanding the oredered list of the twenty that any "observer" present may have compiled. Twenty ballot papers from the oredered stack can then be supplied so that the twenty people choose their ballot papers RANDOMLY. Only after all the twenty people have acknowledged receipt of a ballot paper, can the ballot casting then begin for them. Within the group of 20, it will be virtually impossible to match a ballot caster to the ballot!
Such a method of casting votes will not achieve 100 % anonymity, but it will go a long way towards ensuring a minimally acceptable level of voter anonymity.
The Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) saga is confusing many people. Some people advocate use of the machines, provided the machines print something called Voter Verified Paper Trail (VVPAT). Other people, among whom I count myself, reject the EVM unconditionally, VVPAT or no VVPAT. Yet a third group ofcourse, want the EVM adopted and used as the current legislation stipulates - no VVPAT. Among the numerous arguments presented against VVPAT by the third group of people is that VVPAT compromises the secrecy of the ballot. I do not know enough about VVPAT implementation to argue for or against such a view.
What I do know is that an EVM is a computer. It therefore participates in the vote-casting process as an active agent. If it can add my vote to that of the previous voter who voted for the same candidate as me, then it is perfectly capable of NOT adding my vote as just described. By so doing it will have interfered with my vote! Furthemore, the EVM can be made to print two lists; list 1 corresponding to how the voter has voted, while list 2 corresponds to how the vote rigger has programmed the EVM to "cast its own vote, using the voter's ID". The voter in the booth could then be presented with list 1, while list 2 is conveniently hidden away. Unless the voter CAN sign list 1 to authenticate his/her vote, then there is nothing stopping the EVM scammers/riggers replacing list 1 with list 2 at the counting centres, and correspondingly replacing the numbers of votes as genuninely cast by voters with votes "as cast independently by the EVM, using the voters' IDs". Using this unsigned method, a fraudulent VVPAT (list 2) will end up corresponding exactly to the fraudulent ballot count presented as the election result. Using a signed list 1 on the other hand might prevent the fraud, but just like the current "OPEN" ballot casting method, a signed list 1 might compromise ballot secrecy.
So there really is only one safe option where EVM are concerned - they have to be UNCONDITIONALLY rejected. One last thing to note is that the moment a rigged EVM has the voter's roll programmed into it, the voters are not really needed any more; the EVM can do the voting all by itself, and produce nice rigged results!
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